The truck cartel was an extensive and long-standing agreement among leading truck manufacturers that affected the entire European Economic Area (EEA). These illegal agreements began in January 1997 and continued until January 2011. During this period, all involved truck manufacturers were continuously engaged in cartel agreements. According to established case law, these agreements impacted the purchase and leasing of new trucks during the period from January 1, 1998, to December 31, 2011 (cartel period), as well as from January 1, 2012, to December 31, 2013 (post-cartel period). International Dimension of the Truck Cartel Interestingly, the behavior of the cartel participants was not only identified and sanctioned within the EEA. Similar agreements were also uncovered outside of Europe, such as by the Korean cartel authority in December 2013. The Korean authorities imposed substantial fines on the European truck manufacturers, highlighting the global reach of the cartel activities.

The truck cartel affected several hundred thousand buyers due to its significant market coverage, especially in Germany, where over 90 percent of truck sales were potentially influenced by the cartel agreements. Directly Affected Companies Companies directly harmed are those that purchased new trucks from the involved manufacturers or dealers during the cartel period or within the first two years thereafter. Indirectly Affected Buyers In addition to the direct buyers, indirectly affected parties, such as lessees, are also impacted. This group includes those who leased trucks and thereby indirectly bore the inflated costs caused by the cartel. They, too, are entitled to compensation, as they suffered financial disadvantages due to the cartel-induced price increases. Directly Affected Companies The companies most directly harmed are those that purchased trucks from the involved manufacturers during the cartel period or shortly thereafter. These companies may have paid inflated prices due to the illegal price-fixing agreements, which artificially increased their operating costs and potentially impaired their competitiveness. Indirectly Affected Parties In addition to the direct buyers, indirectly affected parties, such as lessees, were also impacted. This group includes companies or individuals who leased trucks and thus indirectly bore the inflated costs caused by the cartel. They, too, have claims for damages as they suffered financial losses due to the cartel-induced price increases.

The sanctioned cartel agreements involved coordinating manufacturer gross prices and jointly scheduling the introduction of emission reduction technologies, particularly concerning the stringent European emission standards. This behavior had direct impacts on medium-duty trucks with a gross vehicle weight of 6 to 16 tons and heavy-duty trucks over 16 tons. Coordination of Prices The involved manufacturers coordinated the gross prices for different classes of trucks. These agreements resulted in restricted competition and maintained prices at artificially high levels, to the detriment of buyers and end consumers. Response to Emission Standards Another focus of the agreements was the coordinated response to European emission standards, ranging from Euro III to the currently valid Euro VI. The manufacturers agreed on the timeline for introducing new emission reduction technologies. This included both the timing of the market introduction of these technologies and the passing on of the associated costs to the customers. Impacts and Consequences These practices were ultimately classified as cartel violations by the EU Commission and accordingly sanctioned. The exposure and penalization of these cartel agreements play a crucial role in ensuring fair market conditions and protecting consumer interests. The intervention of the EU Commission set an important precedent, demonstrating the importance of adhering to antitrust laws for the market’s functionality.